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CRIMINAL MALPRACTICE: PRIVILEGE OF THE
INNOCENT PLAINTIFF?
INTRODUCTION
Criminal malpractice, in which an attorney is accused of negligently
defending his client in a criminal proceeding,' constitutes a small but
increasing percentage2 of legal malpractice suits. Although criminal
malpractice is almost identical to civil malpractice, the criminal malprac-
tice plaintiff faces two additional obstacles to his suit.3 First, most juris-
dictions' have been hesitant to allow plaintiffs to bring and win criminal
malpractice suits without first having successfully shown ineffective
assistance of counsel in a separate action.5 Consequently, the criminal
malpractice plaintiff essentially is forced to bring an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim prior to bringing a malpractice suit.6 Second, a smaller
number of jurisdictions7 have recently required plaintiffs to prove actual
1. See Bogutz & Albert, A Survey of the Developing Pennsylvania Law of Attorney
Malpractice, 61 Temp. L. Rev. 1237, 1273 (1988).
2. See R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 21.1, at 284 & n.4 (3d ed. 1989);
Bogutz & Albert, supra note 1, at 1273. The increase in criminal malpractice suits is
expected to continue. See id. In fact, the present paucity of criminal malpractice suits
has been called the "calm before the storm." Id. at 1275.
3. See infra notes 30-66 and accompanying text.
4. See J. Burkoff, Criminal Defense Ethics § 3.3, at 3-16 (1986); infra note 5.
5. See, e.g., Downton v. Vandemark, 571 F. Supp. 40, 43-44 (N.D. Ohio 1983)
(plaintiff must prove reversal of conviction plus dismissal on the merits or an acquittal on
retrial), explained by Kraln v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St. 3d 103, 106, 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1062
(1989); Bledstein v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 428, 442, 162 Cal. App. 3d 152, 173
(Ct. App. 1984) ("[A] criminal defendant whose conviction has not been reversed, or
whose sentence has not been modified after a challenge has been made on competency-of-
counsel grounds, has a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to overcome in trying to show
any damage resulted from the alleged malpractice."); Johnson v. Schmidt, 719 S.W.2d
825, 826 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) ("The present action is premature, until such time as appel-
lant is successful in securing post-conviction relief upon a finding that he was denied
effiective assistance of counsel."); Weaver v. Carson, 62 Ohio App. 2d 99, 101, 404 N.E.2d
1344, 1346 (Ct. App. 1979) (plaintiffs must show conviction was reversed based on inef-
fective assistance of counsel), explained by Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St. 3d 103, 106, 538
N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (1989); J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.1(c), at 3-10 to 3-11 (plaintiff
whose conviction has not been reversed may have "insurmountable obstacle" in showing
damages). But see Jepson v. Stubbs, 555 S.W.2d 307, 313 (Mo. 1977) (en banc) (holding
that setting aside the conviction was not a condition to maintaining suit).
The requirement that the plaintiff must first reverse his conviction, means the plain-
tiff's guilt precludes his ability to bring a malpractice suit against his attorney. See Wei-
ner v. Mitchell, 114 Cal. App. 3d 39, 48, 170 Cal. Rptr 533, 538 (Ct. App. 1980). In
Weiner the court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevented the plaintiff from
relitigating the issue of guilt and precluded him from bringing a malpractice suit. See id.;
see also Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St. 3d 103, 106, 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (1989) ("[I]n
most cases the failure to secure a reversal of the underlying criminal conviction may bear
upon and even destroy the plaintiff's ability to establish the element of proximate
cause.").
6. See supra note 5.
7. Specifically, New York and Illinois have imposed a requirement that the criminal
malpractice plaintiff show his actual innocence of the underlying crime. See Walker v.
Kruse, 484 F.2d 802, 804 (7th Cir. 1973) ("An Illinois court might well hold, as a matter
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innocence with respect to the underlying offense even if their conviction
was reversed on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.' In all states,
even those not requiring actual innocence, if the plaintiff's attempt to
reverse his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel was
unsuccessful, the attorney-defendant may assert that the plaintiff's mal-
practice claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.9 This Note
only addresses cases in which plaintiffs have brought a prior ineffective
assistance claim.
This Note asserts that the actual innocence standard is unnecessary
because collateral estoppel provides sufficient protection against meritless
criminal malpractice claims. Part I describes the criminal malpractice
claim. Part II examines the attorney's collateral estoppel defense. Part
III analyzes the actual innocence requirement and its justifications. This
Note concludes that forcing plaintiffs to show actual innocence is unnec-
essary and that such a requirement leads to unfair and undesirable
results.
I. BACKGROUND
Legal malpractice is a type of professional negligence in which an at-
torney fails to meet the standards of a reasonably competent attorney.10
The client in these actions sues his former lawyer alleging negligence.'1
In the vast majority of legal malpractice suits brought against trial attor-
neys, the underlying lawsuit is a civil suit, hence the name "civil
malpractice."1 2
In most respects, a criminal malpractice suit is identical to a civil mal-
practice suit.13 Both require the establishment of an attorney-client rela-
tionship, which gives rise to a duty owed by the attorney to the client. 4
of law, that a criminal conviction cannot support a malpractice claim unless the plaintiff
is able to establish his actual innocence."); Carmel v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d 169, 173, 511
N.E.2d 1126, 1128, 518 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (1987) ("plaintiff must allege his innocence or
a colorable claim of innocence"); Winkler v. Messinger, Alperin & HufJay, 147 A.D.2d
693, 693, 538 N.Y.S.2d 299, 300 (2d Dep't 1989) (malpractice claim did not set forth
viable cause of action because it did not allege plaintiff's innocence of criminal charges);
B.K. Industries, Inc. v. Pinks, 143 A.D.2d 963, 965, 533 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596-97 (2d Dep't
1988) (client seeking malpractice damages for negligent misrepresentation in criminal
case had burden to prove his innocence); Claudio v. Heller, 119 Misc. 2d 432, 433-35, 463
N.Y.S.2d 155, 156-57 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (no viable malpractice claim because plaintiff did
not allege innocence).
8. See infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 30-56 and accompanying text.
10. See Trice v. Mozenter, 356 Pa. Super. 510, 517, 515 A.2d 10, 13 (Super. Ct.
1986); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts 185-86 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton).
11. See Trice, 356 Pa. Super. at 517, 515 A.2d at 13.
12. See Bogutz & Albert, supra note 1, at 1273 & nn. 285-86.
13. See Note, Criminal Malpractice: Threshold Barriers to Recovery Against Negli-
gent Criminal Counsel, 1981 Duke L.J. 542, 542-43.
14. See Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 692 (Minn. 1980);
J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.1(b)(1), at 3-5. The appointed attorney owes his client the
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The attorney's duty is not defined specifically but rather requires that he
render to the client reasonably competent legal representation."5 More-
over, as a "specialist" the criminal defense attorney may have a duty to
use greater skill in his area of expertise than would a general
practitioner. 1
6
As in civil malpractice suits, the criminal malpractice plaintiff must
show both that the attorney-defendant breached his duty by failing to
meet the standard of a reasonably competent attorney, 7 and that the
attorney factually"8 and proximately caused 9 injury to the plaintiff. The
same duty as the retained attorney. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 200-01 n.17
(1979).
15. Although the requirement of reasonable competence is phrased differently in vari-
ous jurisdictions the requirement is essentially "to give legal advice or to render other
legal services [and] use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and
capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they un-
dertake." Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 587, 15 Cal. Rptr 821, 825, 364 P.2d 685, 689
(1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 987 (1962); see, eg., Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Tyler,
161 Ga. App. 267, 273, 291 S.E.2d 6, 12 (CL App. 1982) (duty requires attorney to
exercise reasonable care and skill under the circumstances); Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20,
24, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (1986) (quoting Cook, Flanagan & Burst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d
393, 395, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968)) (duty requires attorney to exercise the "degree of
care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable,
careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this jurisdiction").
16. See Rodriguez v. Horton, 95 N.M. 356, 359, 622 P.2d 261, 264 (Ct. App. 1980); J.
Burkoff, supra note 4, at § 3.1(b)(2), at 3-6 - 9; see also Prosser & Keeton, supra note 10,
at 187 (doctors representing themselves as having greater skill must meet a greater stan-
dard of care).
17. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated by the American
Bar Association ("ABA") in 1969, and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ap-
proved by the ABA House of Delegates in 1983 are codes of professional ethics that
define the attorney's role. These rules specify, for example, that an attorney must not
accept any client the protection of whose interest may adversely affect his ability to repre-
sent another client, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 (1983), Model Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 5-105(A) and (B) (1980). Also, the attorney must com-
municate any plea bargain offer to his client and allow the client to decide whether to
accept such offer, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1983). Although
violations of these codes do not necessarily give rise to malpractice liability, there is a de
facto relationship between legal malpractice and professional ethics, and courts com-
monly refer to such rules in defining the attorney's obligation for purposes of a malprac-
tice claim. See J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.2, at 3-15; Vance v. Robinson, 292 F. Supp.
786, 788 (W.D.N.C. 1968). As one treatise stated, "ethical code provisions are often
cited, argued, and discussed in legal malpractice cases; they are, however, typically not
considered to be of precedential weight in such proceedings in and of themselves." J.
Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.2, at 3-15 (citation omitted).
18. To establish factual causation, the plaintiff must show that but for the attorney's
negligence the plaintiff would have prevailed. This "but for" requirement can be consid-
ered a "trial within a trial." See Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel -
Reflections on "Criminal Malpractice", 21 UCLA L. Rev. 1191, 1201-03 (1974). The
criminal malpractice plaintiff, however, does not have to show that he would have pre-
vailed completely, but rather that he would have fared better had his attorney been com-
petent. See Schlumm v. Terrence J. O'Hagan, P.C., 173 Mich. App. 345, 359, 433
N.W.2d 839, 846 (Ct. App. 1988) ("A plaintiff in a legal malpractice action need not
show that he would have prevailed completely in the former action in order to recover
where the allegation is that the verdict against him was greater than what would have
been returned in the absence of the defendant's negligence"). Cf. J. Burkoff, supra note 4,
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plaintiff must also show that he has suffered damages from the attorney's
negligence.20 Malpractice claims may allege negligence on many differ-
ent grounds,2" including failure to investigate adequately, 2 failure to
make a supression motion, 3 and failure to consult with or advise the
client adequately. 4
Courts and commentators have noted that many criminal malpractice
complaints are meritless2 5 One explanation asserted for the large pro-
portion of meritless claims is that "criminal defense practice invariably
results in a great many disgruntled former clients who have a lot of time
on their hands."26 Moreover, the problem of former clients asserting
meritless claims is generally worse for court-appointed attorneys.27 The
accused sometimes views the court-appointed attorney as an instrument
of the state, and may therefore question the attorney's desire to represent
him zealously. 8 Collateral estoppel has emerged as one of the most ef-
fective defenses to such meritless litigation. 9
§ 3.1(c), at 3-10 ("iT]he plaintiff must demonstrate at the legal malpractice trial that in
the hypothesized, legal proceedings which are the subject of the litigation, absent the
attorney's breach of duty, the client would not have been similarly injured in any event.")
(emphasis added).
19. See J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.1(a), at 3-2. "Proximate cause" or "legal cause"
is "merely the limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for
the consequences of the actor's conduct." Prosser & Keeton, supra note 10, at 264. In
addition to requiring that the plaintiff show factual causation, the court determines as a
matter of law whether the plaintiff can show proximate cause. This limitation is deter-
mined to some extent by an examination of how close the association is between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury. See id. "[T]o [a] greater extent, however,
the legal limitation on the scope of liability is associated with policy," with ideas of what
is just, possible or convenient. Id.
20. See R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 2, § 27.8, at 649 (3d ed. 1989).
21. The most common assertions of negligence against criminal defense attorneys are
inadequate grand jury or other investigative body representation, inadequate or
unlawful pretrial preparation or investigation, inadequate presentation of a de-
fense, failure to consult with or to advise the client, conspiratorial activity di-
rected against the client, failure to appear on behalf of the client, bad advice to
tender-or actions coercing-nolo contendere or guilty pleas, bad advice about
the law, conflicts of interest, failure to file--or negligence relating to-post-ver-
dict motions or appeals, failure to keep confidential client information secret,
failure to file suppression or other pre-trial motions, inadequate disclosure to
the client of significant information, improper or untimely withdrawal or threat
to withdraw from representation, and the charging of an exorbitant fee for
services.
J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.5, at 3-21 to 3-23 (citations omitted). See id. and citations
therein for a listing of illustrative cases.
22. See Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924 (2d Cir. 1979); Carey v. Campbell, 93
A.D.2d 923, 923, 462 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (1983).
23. See Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802, 804 (7th Cir. 1973); Hibbett v. City of Cincin-
nati, 4 Ohio App. 3d 128, 131, 446 N.E.2d 832, 835 (1982).
24. See Ferguson v. Burkett, 454 So. 2d 413, 414 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
25. See J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.5, at 3-20 - 3-21.
26. Id. at 3-20.
27. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 200-01 n.17 (1979).
28. See id.
29. See infra notes 30-56 and accompanying text.
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II. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
In most jurisdictions, the criminal malpractice plaintiff must clear a
significant hurdle before bringing a malpractice claim: the court effec-
tively requires him to first bring an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.3" If this claim is unsuccessful, the attorney-defendant has a collat-
eral estoppel defense and therefore the subsequent malpractice claim will
most likely be dismissed.3
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Strickland Standard
A criminal defendant has the right to attack the reliability of his con-
viction and assert that he has been denied his constitutional right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel.32 In Strickland v. Washington,33 the Supreme
Court set forth a two-part standard to determine whether a criminal de-
fendant's conviction must be set aside because of ineffective assistance of
counsel.34 The first prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to
show that counsel's performance was deficient.35 The performance is
deemed insufficient if "counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness." 36
To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must
show that counsel's errors prejudiced the defense.37 This requires that
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
30. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
32. This right derives from the sixth amendment, applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). The sixth
amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are most frequently raised on collateral attack.
See 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 11. 10, at 96 (1984). Defendants are
not foreclosed from making such claims on appeal, however. See id. at n. 14.
The same principles that govern on direct appeal apply in collateral proceedings. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). However, "the presumption that a
criminal judgment is final is at its strongest in collateral attacks on that judgment." Id.
In a federal habeas proceeding, a state court's determination that counsel's representa-
tion was effective is not considered a finding of fact. See id at 698. Rather, "both the
performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions
of law and fact." Id. This gives the reviewing court a wider scope of review. See id.
33. 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
34. See id at 687.
35. See id at 686.
36. Id at 688.
37. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Prejudice is presumed in
certain contexts, such as when there is actual or constructive denial of the assistance of
counsel. See id. at 692; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). Various kinds
of state interference with counsel's assistance create a presumption of prejudice. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. A more limited presumption of prejudice is created when
counsel acts under a conflict of interest. In such cases prejudice is presumed once the
defendant shows that counsel "actively represented conflicting interests" and that "an
actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Id. at 692 (quot-
ing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (footnote omitted)).
1991]
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errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."3
B. Making Use of Collateral Estoppel
Collateral estoppel 9 is a procedural device that prevents relitigation of
issues that have been decided in previous judicial proceedings.' Collat-
eral estoppel requires that both cases contain the same issue, that the
issue was actually litigated in the previous proceeding and that deciding
the issue was necessary to the court's judgment.41 In the criminal mal-
38. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). "An error by counsel, even
if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal
proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." Id. at 691.
The Strickland standard, both in its formulation and application, is highly deferential
to the attorney's conduct. This is considered necessary, partly for the benefit of the ac-
cused. As the court stated, "[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the
range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant." Id.
at 688-89. Such rules "would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence
of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.
Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for representation could distract counsel from
the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause." Id. at 689 (cita-
tions omitted); accord 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 32, § 11.10, at 95 ("If counsel
is not accorded a strong presumption of competency .... counsel, fearful that judicial
hindsight will reject his judgment, may hesitate to follow the path that he believes most
effective in representing his client.").
The second prong of the Strickland test, which relates to the attorney's competency,
may never be addressed because courts may dispose of the ineffectiveness claim by deter-
mining that the defendant's case was not prejudiced:
[A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient
before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the al-
leged deficiencies.... If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we would expect will often be so,
that course should be followed.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
Lower courts have generally heeded this suggestion. "Indeed, in case after case alleg-
ing that counsel's factual investigation was inadequate, the standard response is that there
has been no showing of prejudice .. " 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 32, § 11.10,
at 52 (Supp. 1990); see also id at 54 n.76.5 (listing cases) (Supp. 1990). The fact that a
failure to establish one prong of the Strickland test allows the court to dismiss an ineffec-
tiveness of counsel claim has no bearing on the equivalency of the Strickland and mal-
practice standards. See J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.3, at 3-16 to 3-16.1. In malpractice,
the plaintiff's inability to establish the incompetence or the causation element would sim-
ilarly destroy his claim. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
39. Collateral estoppel is also known as "issue preclusion." See J. Friedenthal, M.
Kane & A. Miller, Civil Procedure, § 14.1, at 609 (1985). The two terms are inter-
changeable. See id.
40. See C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4463
(1981).
41. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). At one time, there was a
requirement of identity of parties, known as a "mutuality requirement." See C. Wright,
A. Miller, and E. Cooper, supra note 40, § 4463, at 559-60 (mutuality requirement ex-
isted for many years in federal and state courts); Black's Law Dictionary 261 (6th ed.
1990) (defining collateral estoppel as requiring prior judgment between same parties). In
most states, a mutuality of parties is no longer required. See C. Wright, A. Miller, E.
Cooper, supra note 40, § 4464, at 570; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29
(1982) (issue preclusion where identity of parties is not required). Such a requirement
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practice context, the attorney-defendant may assert that the client's un-
successful attempt at reversing his conviction through an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim collaterally estops him from bringing a crimi-
nal malpractice suit.42 Collateral estoppel, therefore, works as an affirm-
ative defense to criminal malpractice claims.
C. Similarity of Strickland Standard and Malpractice Standard
Courts and commentators generally agree that a criminal defense at-
torney may use collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense43 to preclude
the client from further asserting that the attorney's incompetence caused
his conviction.' Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue only
would effectively foreclose the attorney's ability to use issue preclusion in the criminal
malpractice context.
Interestingly, some courts allowed the non-mutual use of collateral estoppel in the
criminal malpractice context before the Supreme Court endorsed the abandonment of the
mutuality requirement in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found.,
402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments states: "[L]ong
before the mutuality rule was repudiated in civil cases, well reasoned decisions had ex-
tended the rule of preclusion to operate in favor of third persons where the first action is
criminal and the second is civil." IdL § 85 comment (e); see. eg., Lamore v. Laughlin,
159 F.2d 463, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (court allows use of collateral estoppel in criminal-
civil case twenty-three years before Blonder-Tongue); see also Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So.
2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989) (use of non-mutual defensive collateral estoppel in criminal-civil
context to bar criminal malpractice suit where plaintiff had unsuccessfully asserted inef-
fective assistance claim in prior postconviction proceeding allowed even though state had
not completely abandoned mutuality requirement); Knoblauch v. Kenyon, 163 Mich.
App. 712, 725, 415 N.W.2d 286, 292 (1987) (court allows non-mutual defensive collateral
estoppel in criminal-civil context although state had not yet abandoned mutuality re-
quirement in civil-civil litigation).
42. See. e.g., McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied
451 U.S. 983 (1981) (court upholds district court's grant of defendant-attorneys' motion
for summary judgment with collateral estoppel used as one of the bases for their holding);
Rastelli v. Sutter, Moffatt, Yannelli & Zerin, P.C., 87 A.D.2d 865, 866, 449 N.Y.S.2d
305, 307 (2d Dep't 1982) (action for criminal malpractice barred by collateral estoppel
because of prior determination that plaintiff's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was
inadequate).
43. See Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1130 (5th Cir. 1981); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c);
J. Friedenthal, M. Kane and A. Miller, supra note 39, § 14.9, at 661. As an affirmative
defense, collateral estoppel must be pled in the defendant's answer. See id at 288. Other-
wise it cannot be proved at trial. See id. at 288-89.
44. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 85(2)(a) (1982). But see Schlumm v.
Terrence J. O'Hagan, P.C., 173 Mich. App. 345, 357-58, 433 N.W.2d 839, 845 (Ct. App.
1988) (stating in dicta that third parties should be able to sue the attorney and that collat-
eral estoppel can affect only the time periods of the attorney's representation that the
appellate court addressed); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 620-21 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(Wald, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (unusual circumstances justify allowing
plaintiff to prove malpractice although appellate court determined counsel was effective),
cert. denied 451 U.S. 983 (1981).
In Schlumm, the third parties that the court found not to be collaterally estopped were
the client's parents. See Schlumm, 173 Mich. App. at 357, 433 N.W.2d at 845. The
court in Schlumn also found the plaintiff's breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty
and fraudulent misrepresentation claims against the attorney were not collaterally es-
topped because there was "no identity of issue with the conclusion reached regarding the
1991]
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when the identical issue has been decided in a prior proceeding.4" Courts
have consistently held that the legal standards for ineffective assistance of
counsel and for legal malpractice are similar enough to satisfy the re-
quirement that the second proceeding involve the same issue.46 The
Strickland standard requires the plaintiff to show that his attorney's rep-
resentation was inadequate and that this inadequacy prejudiced his
case.47 This standard is equivalent to the malpractice elements that re-
quire the plaintiff to show that his attorney was negligent and that this
negligence damaged the plaintiff's chance for success in the case.48
The use of collateral estoppel is considered appropriate, therefore, be-
cause in determining whether the attorney's representation was constitu-
tionally ineffective, the court is applying the same standard used to
determine whether an attorney is liable for malpractice. 49 The require-
ments that the issue decided in the unsuccessful ineffective assistance
claim was actually litigated and essential to the court's decision are satis-
fied as well.50
effectiveness of defendant's representation." Schlumn, 173 Mich. App. at 357, 433
N.W.2d at 845.
45. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., McCord, 636 F.2d at 609 ("the legal standards for ineffective assistance
of counsel in [plaintiff's] criminal proceedings and for legal malpractice in this action are
equivalent"); Knoblauch v. Kenyon, 163 Mich. App. 712, 717, 415 N.W.2d 286, 288
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) ("According to plaintiff, the standards for finding ineffective
assistance of counsel and legal malpractice are different, and the ineffective assistance of
counsel standard is more difficult for a client to meet. We disagree."); Krahn v. Kinney,
43 Ohio St. 3d 103, 107 n.8, 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 n.8 (1989) ("Though not identical,
[the Strickland] elements are similar to the elements in an attorney malpractice action.");
Garcia v. Ray, 556 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) ("[H]ow could you test the
adequacy of counsel any better than by having the direct point determined by the highest
court of our State in the related criminal case?"); J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.3, at 3-16.1
("[T]he Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel standard utilized as a matter of sixth
amendment law is quite similar to the legal malpractice standard of care currently used in
most jurisdictions." (footnote omitted)).
The court's ruling in Strickland made the test for ineffectiveness of counsel uniform.
See id. Prior to Strickland, however, there was a multitude of tests to determine whether
counsel was ineffective. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696-97 (1984); J.
Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.3 at 3-16; 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 32, § 11.10, at
36-37 (Supp. 1990) (discussing the various tests). Because these tests were different from
the standard for determining legal malpractice, there was concern over using an adverse
ineffectiveness ruling to estop the malpractice suit. See J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.3 at
3-16; Note, supra note 13, at 552-53 ("In jurisdictions applying the 'farce and mockery'
standard, the client's failure to establish ineffective assistance of counsel should not bar
him from attacking the attorney's competence in a subsequent criminal malpractice
suit."). Id. However, even before Strickland a majority of courts to address the issue
allowed the collateral estoppel defense where the former client had been unsuccessful in
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. See J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.3, at 3-16.1.
For a list of such cases, see id. at n.66.
47. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 43-48.
50. These requirements are satisfied because the court's decision on whether there
was constitutionally ineffective counsel is the issue that is being collaterally estopped.
Therefore, it is certain to have been essential to the court's final decision and actually
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There are, however, arguments against allowing a finding that the at-
torney's performance was constitutionally adequate to provide a collat-
eral estoppel defense to a malpractice claim. The assistance of the
attorney who represented the client at trial may be necessary to show
that his legal representation was constitutionally inadequate.5 By with-
holding his assistance, however, the attorney may cause the client's inef-
fective assistance claim to fail, and he may thereby gain an iron-clad
defense to future malpractice litigation brought by the client.52 Thus,
allowing the attorney a collateral estoppel defense may hinder the client's
ability to show inadequate legal representation and obtain a new trial.
In addition, a constitutional challenge to the adequacy of legal repre-
sentation differs fundamentally from a challenge based on tort law be-
cause the remedies sought are very different. In bringing a malpractice
claim, the plaintiff will almost certainly seek damages, 3 whereas in a
constitutional challenge the claimant seeks a new trial.' The institu-
tional and societal interest in the finality of convictions may create a re-
luctance to reverse a conviction even where the awarding of damages
would be appropriate.55 Nevertheless, despite the countervailing consid-
erations, courts have consistently allowed attorneys to use collateral es-
toppel against criminal malpractice claims.56
III. ACTUAL INNOCENCE
A. Beyond Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Some jurisdictions, such as New York57 and Illinois," not only require
litigated. See Note, supra note 13, at 551-52. But see McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606,
619-21 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wald, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (straightforward
application of collateral estoppel may in some cases be unjust), cert denied 451 U.S. 983
(1981).
51. See Kaus & Mallen, supra note 18, at 1198.
52. Cf id (possibility that ineffectiveness claim may lead to malpractice suits must
have "chilling effect" on lawyers' willingness to assert ineffectiveness).
53. See R Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 2, § 16.1, at 889-90.
54. See Capps v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 260, 263 (1990); McConico v. Alabama, 919 F.2d
1543, 1544 (1990); Kaus & Mallen, supra note 18, at 1199. The Fifth Amendment guar-
antee against double jeopardy is not a bar to reprosecution where through appeal or
collateral attack the defendant has managed to obtain a reversal of his conviction. See
U.S. v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964); 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 32, § 24.4, at
85.
55. Cf Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1983) (new trials impose a heavy burden
on courts, witnesses and victims); Allen v. McCurry, 499 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (arguing that state court's partial finding of no fourth amendment violation
should not preclude a § 1983 claim on same police action).
56. See supra note 44.
57. See, eg., Carmel v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d 169, 173, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128, 518
N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (1987) ("plaintiff must allege his innocence or a colorable claim of
innocence"); Winkler v. Messinger, Alperin & HufJay, 147 A.D.2d 693, 693, 538
N.Y.S.2d 299, 300 (2d Dep't 1989) (malpractice claim did not set forth viable cause of
action because it did not allege plaintiff's innocence of criminal charges); B.K. Industries,
Inc. v. Pinks, 143 A.D.2d 963, 964-65, 533 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596-97 (2d Dep't 1988) (client
seeking malpractice damages for negligent misrepresentation in criminal case had burden
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that the criminal malpractice plaintiff successfully show ineffective assist-
ance of counsel in a separate action but further require the plaintiff to
show his actual innocence of the underlying offense.5 9 The plaintiff in
such a jurisdiction must prove his underlying innocence using the burden
of proof and evidentiary standards of a civil proceeding.' To under-
stand the effect that a requirement of innocence would have on a mal-
practice suit, consider the following scenario: the lawyer of a civil
defendant fails to raise an existing statute of limitations defense and his
client ultimately does not prevail.61 In a civil malpractice suit, the client
is not required to show that he would have prevailed on the merits in
order to have a successful malpractice claim.6 2 The client need only
show that there was a viable defense that his lawyer failed to raise, and
that "but for" such failure he would have prevailed.63
In a criminal malpractice suit, however, when the plaintiff has already
shown ineffective assistance of counsel in a jurisdiction requiring actual
innocence," a reversal based on the attorney's failure to raise a statute-
of-limitations defense would be insufficient to establish a claim for mal-
practice liability.65 A criminal malpractice plaintiff would be required to
to prove his innocence); Claudio v. Heller, 119 Misc. 2d 432, 433-35, 463 N.Y.S.2d 155,
156-57 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (no viable malpractice claim because plaintiff guilty in prior action
could not allege causation in subsequent malpractice suit).
58. See, e.g., Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802, 804 (7th Cir. 1973) (federal court ruled
in this diversity malpractice action that Illinois law might require innocence); Sullivan v.
Weiner, No. 88 C 6813, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 1989) (plaintiff must show inno-
cence of actual charges to succeed in malpractice action).
59. See supra notes 57-58; see also J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.1(c), at 3-10 ("the fact
that there is a basis for a finding of plaintiff's guilt on the record has generally been
deemed to be sufficient to negate the plaintiff's requisite showing of causation") (footnote
omitted).
60. See Sullivan v. Weiner, No. 88 C 6813, slip op. at 1, (N.D. Ill. June 5, 1989). For
a discussion of the evidence that would be available in a malpractice proceeding to show
the client's actual guilt, see Kaus & Mallen, supra note 18, at 1204-06.
61. See, e.g., Fairhaven Textile v. Sheehan, Phinney, Bass & Green, P.A., 695 F.
Supp. 71, 74 (D.N.H. 1988) (failure to raise issue of notice of defects in U.C.C. action);
Ignotov v. Reiter, 425 Mich. 391, 397, 390 N.W.2d 614, 616 (1986) (holding it was
proper to consider whether proper legal representation would have led to a more
favorable result for plaintiff through settlement); cf Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v.
Mahoney, 392 A.2d 16, 17-18 (Me. 1978) (holding that the statute of limitations had not
run and therefore the attorney's failure to assert it as a defense was not negligent).
62. See Fairhaven, 695 F. Supp. at 74.
63. See generally, R. Mallen & J. Smith, supra note 2, § 24.19, at 494-96 (discussing
defenses); see also Kaus & Mallen, supra note 18, at 1203 (attorney's permitting an action
on a debt to default is a sufficient basis for malpractice; the client-debtor need not show
that he did not actually owe the debt).
One appellate court even found that a jury was justified in finding that the civil defend-
ant's case was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to raise a defense that was not legally
viable. The court reasoned that raising the defense might have improved the defendant's
bargaining position in settlement. See Public Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Barrett, 44 Ill. App. 3d
452, 456-57, 357 N.E.2d 1232, 1236-37 (1976).
64. See Sullivan v. Weiner, No. 88 C 6813, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 1989).
65. Imposing a requirement of innocence when the attorney has failed to raise a stat-
ute of limitations defense shows persuasively how the innocence requirement will hinder
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show that he did not commit the underlying crime under the evidentiary
and burden-of-proof standards that govern a civil trial."
B. Justifications for Innocence Requirement
1. Frivolous Litigation
Adoption of the innocence requirement may have been prompted
partly by fears of frivolous litigation from disgruntled criminal defend-
ants.67 A general perception exists that many criminal malpractice com-
plaints are without merit.6" According to this view, the notoriously
litigious nature of convicts,69 may cause public defenders to become vul-
nerable to an onslaught of malpractice suits.70 This onslaught may de-
tract from public defenders' ability to represent effectively the defendants
assigned to them. Some courts have, therefore, favored an actual inno-
cence requirement because it gives the court an easy basis to grant an
attorney's summary judgment motion. It is argued that the requirement
limits the flood of potential criminal malpractice litigation.7
The defense of collateral estoppel is, however, broad enough to ob-
struct frivolous pursuit of criminal malpractice claims. Attorneys may
utilize collateral estoppel where the plaintiff has failed in his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.72 By asserting that the client's unsuccessful
ineffective assistance claim bars a malpractice suit, the attorney takes ad-
vantage of prior litigation to which he was not a party.73 Thus, collateral
estoppel already provides the attorney with a broad, easily asserted de-
fense that allows the court to dispose of many malpractice claims on
summary judgment.74
valid criminal malpractice claims. The attorney who fails to raise a clear-cut, valid tech-
nical defense can more easily be proven negligent than one who overlooks a viable truth-
related defense. See Note, supra note 13, at 547.
66. Thus far, only one court has had occasion to address specifically the situation in
which a plaintiff was called on to prove his actual innocence. See Sullivan v. Wiener, No.
88 C 6813, slip op. at 4, (N.D. Ill. June 5, 1989).
67. See id at 1193.
68. See J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.5, at 3-20 to 3-21.
69. See Kaus & Mallen, supra note 18, at 1193.
70. Cf Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 199 (1979) (observing that immunity for
court-appointed attorneys could avoid discouraging attorneys from representing indigent
clients); Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 495-99, 406 A.2d 735, 743-46 (1979) (O'Brien,
J., dissenting) (arguing that public defenders should be granted immunity to avoid repeti-
tive litigation).
71. Cf Kaus & Mallen, supra note 18, at 1231-32 (suggesting innocence requirement
is appropriate and submitting that "any suggestions for changes from the Bar would
command a more respectful hearing today... than ten years from now when [criminal
malpractice] may be making a more substantial contribution to the judicial logjam").
72. See infra note 74 and authorities cited therein.
73. The attorney is not forced to take part in the ineffective assistance of counsel
proceeding because that is brought by the criminal defendant against the state. See Note,
supra note 13, at 556.
74. See, eg., McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 610-11 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (application of
collateral estoppel precludes legal malpractice claim), cerL denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981);
Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989) (approving use of defensive collateral
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Furthermore, the innocence requirement may preclude criminal de-
fendants from bringing otherwise worthy criminal malpractice claims.75
The Strickland test76 requires courts to give great leeway to defense
counsel's strategic decisions.77 When a court reverses a criminal convic-
tion for ineffective assistance of counsel, the defense counsel's error is
most likely to have been a clear-cut technical mistake that may have no
relation to the plaintiff's guilt.7" The innocence requirement, therefore,
may prevent plaintiffs from asserting criminal malpractice claims in situ-
ations where they may be most likely to maintain successful ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.7 9
estoppel to prevent relitigating issue litigated in prior criminal proceeding); Knoblauch v.
Kenyon, 163 Mich. App. 712, 715, 415 N.W.2d 286, 287 (1987) (because same standards
are used for ineffective counsel and criminal malpractice claims, collateral estoppel bars
relitigation absent new issues); Rastelli v. Sutter, Moffatt, Yannelli & Zerin, P.C., 87
A.D.2d 865, 866, 449 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (2d Dep't 1982) (where criminal defendant has
had full and fair opportunity to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in prior pro-
ceeding, he is barred from relitigating by collateral estoppel); Garcia v. Ray, 556 S.W.2d
870, 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (adjudication of ineffective assistance of counsel bars
further assertion of attorney's incompetence); J. Burkoff, supra note 4, § 3.3 at 3-16 (inef-
fectiveness of counsel adversely decided in criminal post-trial proceeding bars claim of
legal malpractice).
75. See Kaus & Mallen, supra note 18, at 1205 ("[T]he temptation to urge the rele-
vance of actual guilt is strongest in situations in which the malpractice may be the least
excusable .... [M]alpractice is liable to be most obvious where it consists of a failure to
raise ... a 'technical' defense . . ").
76. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 38.
78. See 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 32, § 11.10, at 46 (Supp. 1990) ("A
possible strategic justification is more difficult to hypothesize, however, where counsel
failed to raise a claim of apparent merit which would have resulted in dismissal of the
charges with prejudice - such as double jeopardy, the denial of a speedy trial, or the
statute of limitations.")(footnote omitted). Examples of such technical defenses that
might provide a basis for ineffectiveness of counsel if not raised include the exclusionary
rule, the statute of limitations and the rule against improper grand jury selection. See
Note, supra note 13, at 549 and citations therein.
79. Kaus & Mallen, supra note 18, at 1205 & nn. 41-43. As one commentator noted,
"[A]ny ruling that actual guilt is relevant.., should be made with full awareness of the
consequence that such a decision just about destroys criminal malpractice as an actiona-
ble tort in the very type of situation where the lawyer's incompetence is most flagrant and
its consequences most easily demonstrable." Kaus & Mallen, supra note 18, at 1205.
Sullivan v. Wiener, No. 88 C 6813 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 1989), provides an example of the
effect of the innocence requirement. The plaintiff successfully challenged his murder con-
viction through a habeas corpus petition and received an order of nolle prosequi from the
state. See slip op. at 1. He then brought a malpractice action against his attorney alleg-
ing negligence based on the attorney's failure to locate and interview five exculpatory
witnesses. See id. In the malpractice suit, the plaintiff sought to bar discovery of evi-
dence of guilt which the state had failed to introduce in the underlying criminal prosecu-
tion. See id. The plaintiff argued that his only requirement under Illinois law was to
show that but for the defendant's negligence the verdict would have been different. See
id. The plaintiff, therefore, contended that his actual guilt was irrelevant and that the
only relevant evidence with respect to causation was the trial transcript and the testimony
of the missing witnesses. See id.
After surveying the law in several states, the court held that the plaintiff was required
to show his innocence, stating "we see no indication that Illinois would depart from what
is clearly the prevailing rule in other jurisdictions." Id. at 2. The court, however, did
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2. Public Policy - Constitutional Criminal Safeguards
Courts have used the unique structure of the criminal justice system to
justify the actual innocence requirement."0 The criminal justice system
has constitutional safeguards that are designed to provide a check on
police conduct."' The criminal legal system often provides an enforce-
ment mechanism for these constitutional safeguards often through ex-
cluding probative evidence from the trial.82 This sometimes results in the
acquittal of criminal defendants who actually committed the crime with
which they are charged.83 These occasional acquittals are windfalls to
criminal defendants. Some courts make the argument that the actual in-
nocence requirement for the criminal malpractice claims may ensure that
guilty criminal defendants do not get windfall damages from their attor-
ney's failure to procure a "windfall acquittal. ' ' "s
not rule on who had the burden of proof, stating that "[w]hether the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving his innocence as an element of his claim, or whether the defendants
bear the burden of proving guilt as [a] defense, we leave for the parties to brief with
regard to jury instructions." Id. at 2 n.3.
Many substantive and procedural questions remain as to how courts should manage
the innocence issue. "(1) Is it part of the client's prima facie malpractice case to prove his
innocence by a preponderance of the evidence? (2) May the lawyer raise the client's guilt
as a sort of affirmative defense with respect to which he carries the burden of proof? Or,
(3) Is actual guilt relevant only with respect to certain elements of damage?". Kaus and
Mallen, supra note 18, at 1200 n. 25.
80. See Sullivan v. Wiener, No. 88 C 6813, slip op. at I (N.D. Ill. June 5, 1989);
Carmel v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d 169, 173, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128, 518 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607
(1987).
81. See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) ("exclusionary rules are very
much aimed at deterring lawless conduct by police and prosecution"); Kaus & Mallen,
supra note 18, at 1203 ("[A] parallel assumption of congruence between actual innocence
and acquittal is misplaced. For well understood reasons the criminal process is struc-
tured in such a way that many accused clients who are in fact guilty will escape
conviction.").
82. See Kaus & Mallen, supra note 18, at 1204; infra note 83.
83. For example, the Supreme Court stated,
Miranda v. Arizona excludes confessions flowing from custodial interrogations
unless adequate warnings were administered and a waiver was obtained. Weeks
v. United States and Mapp v. Ohio make impermissible the introduction of evi-
dence obtained in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. In each
instance, and without regard to its probative value, evidence is kept from the trier
of guilt or innocence for reasons wholly apart from enhancing the reliability of
verdicts.
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1972) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
84. New York's highest court has stated that
[if a criminal defendant] cannot assert his innocence, public policy prevents
maintenance of a malpractice action against his attorney.... [C]riminal prose-
cutions involve constitutional and procedural safeguards designed to maintain
the integrity of the judicial system and to protect criminal defendants from
overreaching governmental actions. These aspects of criminal proceedings
make criminal malpractice cases unique, and policy considerations require dif-
ferent pleading and substantive rules.
Carmel v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d 169, 173-74, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128, 518 N.Y.S.2d 605,
607 (1987) (citation omitted). See Sullivan v. Wiener, No. 88 C 6813, slip op. at I (N.D.
Ill. June 5, 1989).
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Concomitant to the actual innocence requirement's power to prevent
windfall damages, however, is its power to free the attorney who fails to
utilize these constitutional procedures from liability. One of the pur-
poses of tort law is to deter negligence. s5 Potential malpractice liability is
thought to keep a lawyer "on his toes,"'8 6 ensuring that the defense law-
yer will pursue all constitutional protections available to his client. If
liability cannot be imposed, constitutional violations may go unasserted,
undermining the intended affect of these procedures to safeguard certain
constitutional rights.8 7
The availability of malpractice claims to criminal defendants facilitates
the sixth amendment's goal of providing the accused with adequate coun-
sel.88 In lieu of a private civil malpractice claim for attorney negligence
in a criminal defense, the state bar would be the only method of assuring
competent levels of legal professionalism. 9 State bar associations are
often reluctant to impose sanctions for attorney incompetence," how-
ever, and do not have as strong an incentive to punish incompetency as
malpractice plaintiffs in search of compensation.9 The focus of state
disciplinary committees vis-a-vis criminal defense lawyers is, further-
more, most frequently on overzealousness rather than incompetence.92
The innocence requirement is, to some extent, devised to prevent the
criminal defendant from using the constitutional windfalls that the crimi-
nal justice system provides to procure a favorable tort judgment.93 As-
suming that this goal is valid, a per se innocence requirement is an
inappropriate way to achieve it. Some criminal defendants, who are not
innocent of the crime, suffer harm as a result of their attorney's negli-
85. See, e-g., Prosser & Keeton, supra note 10, § 4, at 25-26 ("When the decisions of
the courts become known, and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of
course a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm. Not infrequently one
reason for imposing liability is the deliberate purpose of providing that incentive.").
86. Kaus & Mallen, supra note 18, at 1196.
87. See Note, supra note 13, at 550. The claim of criminal malpractice is essential to
allowing the criminal defendant to pursue his constitutional rights aggressively. Cf.
Hitch v. Pima County Superior Court, 146 Ariz. 588, 596, 708 P.2d 72, 80 (1985) (Feld-
man, J., dissenting) (Criminal defense counsel maintains the integrity of personal rights
by assuring the government meet constitutional requirements. "The system was designed
to restrain governmental power and protect all citizens from tyranny.").
88. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective Self-
Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 639, 642-43
(institutions of quality control have not effectively regulated legal profession); Young &
Hill, Professionalism: The Necessity for Internal Control, 61 Temp. L. Rev. 205, 209
(1988) ("efficacy of formal rules" is questionable).
90. See Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69
Geo. L.J. 705, 712-13 (1981).
91. See id. at 712-13.
92. See Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Compe-
tent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 473, 494 (most of the attention of disciplinary
committees on criminal defense lawyers focuses on their overzealous representation
rather than their maintainence of a minimum competence level).
93. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
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gence that has no relation to any constitutional protection.' For exam-
ple, the defense attorney may negligently represent the client during
sentencing, causing the client to receive a longer sentence.95 Similarly, a
defense attorney may neglect to challenge the prosecution's failure to
prove an essential element of a charged crime.96 Thus, the client risks
conviction of a more serious crime than one he actually committed.
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel is Sufficient
If the plaintiff is successful in challenging his conviction through an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court should allow the plaintiff
to proceed with a criminal malpractice suit without further requiring him
to prove actual innocence of the underlying offense. Given the strin-
gency of the Strickland standard,9" plaintiffs' claims in such cases would
not be frivolous. Conversely, if plaintiffs receive adverse rulings with re-
spect to their ineffective assistance claim, attorney-defendants may suc-
cessfully claim collateral estoppel, thereby barring the criminal-plaintiffs'
civil claim. 99
CONCLUSION
Courts have developed the actual innocence requirement in response
to concerns that are unique to criminal malpractice. The actual inno-
cence requirement is, however, an overly broad rule that may enable
criminal defense attorneys to act without fear of civil liability. The re-
quirement of bringing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, coupled
with the defense of collateral estoppel, gives the attorney an easily as-
serted way to defend against frivolous claims and gives the court an effi-
cient way to dispose of such litigation. In cases when the attorney is not
able to assert such a defense, the court should examine the merits of the
plaintiff's case. If the claim has merit, the plaintiff should be allowed to
maintain his malpractice claim.
Susan M. Treyz
94. Cf Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St. 3d 103, 107, 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (1989).
95. See Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718, 719 (La. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978) (attorney failed to object to four-year sentence
imposed for offense carrying two-year maximum penalty).
96. See Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 91, 92 (D.NJ. 1988).
97. See id.
98. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
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